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1THE CWC VERIFICATION REGIME:    IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE BIOTECHNOLOGICAL & PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
by J P Perry Robinson*
Introduction
1.  The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC)1 is considering "measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve
the implementation of the Convention"  through a legally binding instrument.2   The AHG
successfully transitioned in July 1997 to consideration of a rolling text for the Protocol which
has now developed to contain language, albeit with square brackets indicating alternative
views, for most if not all that is required for an effective Protocol.
2.  Particular attention is being given by the AHG to devising an integrated regime that is
effective in building confidence in compliance by States Parties with the Convention.3
Comprising declarations, visits and investigations as its three main pillars, such an integrated
regime would strike a proper balance in the declarations it required from those facilities of
particular relevance to the Convention whilst avoiding the unnecessary burden which could
result were declarations to be required from all facilities of possible relevance to the
Convention.   The current draft Protocol4 provides for declarations by the following types of
microbiological production facility:
(ii) Which produce vaccines [and/or toxoids/anatoxins][licensed by the State Party]
for the protection of humans [against listed agents or toxins][with a production
capacity as specified in Annex...][with primary production containment];
(iii) Which produce vaccines [and/or toxoids/anatoxins][licensed by the State Party]
for the protection of animals [against listed agents or toxins][with a production
capacity as specified in Annex...][with primary production containment];
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Harvard Sussex Program.
1United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Resolution
2826(XXVI), 16 December 1971.
2United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1, Geneva, 19 - 30 September 1994.
3Graham S Pearson, The  Strengthened BTWC Protocol : An Integrated Regime,  University of Bradford
Briefing Paper No 10, July 1998.   Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
4The current version of the rolling text is that produced following the January 1998 meeting together with the
further changes issued following the March 1998 meeting.  United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc
Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC
GROUP/39, 2 February 1998 and United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties
to the Convention on the prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/40, 17 March 1998.   Also
available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
2[(iv) Which produce plant inoculants and/or biological control agent(s) and have a
plant quarantine capability [with primary production containment];]
[(viii) Other microbiological production facilities...not working with listed agents
which have an aggregate fermenter production capacity of [100][1000]litres or
more...
and infrequent non-challenge visits to declared facilities.
3. These proposals have led people within the pharmaceutical and biotechnology-based
industry to suggest that a strengthened BTWC would impose a whole new type of burden on
the industry.  Yet in fact the industry, like the rest of the chemicals industry, falls within the
ambit of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force a year
ago and currently has 108 States Parties, including all EU Member-States and all other major
industrialized countries.  Another 60 States have signed but not yet completed the requisite
ratification processes.  This Briefing Paper sets out some of the key provisions of the CWC,
including the verification regime set out in the CWC Verification Annex, the implementation
of which is now getting under way in the industry.  The Briefing Paper draws lessons from
the CWC experience for the strengthening of the BTWC.
Overview of the CWC Verification Regime
4.   The verification regime for the CWC is a system operated jointly by, on the one hand, the
Technical Secretariat of the CWC's international authority, the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) based at The Hague, and, on the other hand, the
"national authorities" which, under CWC Art VII.4, each State Party is required to designate
or establish "[i]n order to fulfil its obligations under this Convention".  The treaty defines
chemical weapons in such a way as to bring within its purview any activity involving toxic
chemicals, broadly defined, or substances from which toxic chemicals can be made.  Some
parts of pharmaceutical and biotechnology-based industry are therefore already experiencing
the CWC verification regime.  Moreover, the entire industry (except where located within
countries not party to the treaty) is subject to the 'challenge inspection' procedures of the
regime.  The  purpose of this Briefing Paper is to outline these CWC-mandated controls on
biotechnology.
5.   The CWC-verification system has several components.5  Some are inspection activities
of various types.  These are the "verification measures provided for in this Convention"
which the OPCW Technical Secretariat, according to CWC Art VIII.37, must carry out.
More specifically, according to CWC Verification Annex Part II.3, these activities are to be
performed by the Secretariat's "designated inspectors and inspection assistants", and only by
them.  Other components of the verification system are declaration activities: the collection,
reporting and processing of specified kinds of information relating to chemical weapons or to
                                                
5A systemic analysis of the CWC verification regime is contained in the present authorÕs ÒThe Verification
System for the Chemical Weapons ConventionÓ, in Hague Academy of International Law, The Convention on
the Prohibition and Elimination of Chemical Weapons: A Breakthrough in Multilateral Disarmament, edited by
Daniel Bardonnet (Nijhoff, 1995) pp 489-506.
3technologies that could be used to make them.  Herein lies a division of labour that underpins
the entire verification regime.  The National Authorities are responsible for collecting and
reporting the information that the Convention obliges States Parties to declare either at
regular intervals or when occasion arises, depending on the type of information.  The
Technical Secretariat is responsible for receiving and processing the declarations and, through
the 'routine inspection' procedures, for validating some of them.  To be able to make the
declarations, the National Authorities must have entered into an intimate monitoring
relationship with all relevant parts of their countries' technological base, including civil
industry.  High standards of monitoring are in principal assured through the relationship of
mutual scrutiny between the National Authorities and the Technical Secretariat instituted by
the many international procedures of the treaty.  Completing the regime is the possibility of
short-notice challenge inspection at virtually any location, a threat which the Convention
poses so as to deter potentially non-compliant States from exploiting technologies or facilities
that lie outside the declarations-bounded domain of routine inspection.
6.   In the broad architecture of the CWC verification regime, three principal elements can
thus be discerned: mandatory declarations, routine inspection, and challenge inspection.  The
strength of the overall construct must depend not only on system-design but also on the
powers of the system-operators Ð the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the National
Authorities Ð and on their respective propensities for collaboration within their assigned
division of labour.  The prevailing tendency in international relations today is still to
minimize the autonomy and capacity for independent action of international organizations
such as the OPCW.  So, whether CWC-derived controls do or do not come to bear down
heavily upon biotechnology would appear, at the present juncture, to depend less on what the
OPCW Technical Secretariat does and more on what the National Authorities choose to do.
It is important in the present paper, therefore, to identify the role and powers of the National
Authorities within the overall regime.
Role and Powers of the Article VII National Authorities
7.   The purpose of the verification system is to generate and sustain confidence among the
States Parties that they are better off inside the CWC than outside it:6 that it is worth their
while continuing to pay their membership dues and to accept the constraints and burdens
imposed by the treaty.  The verification system itself contributes to those burdens, which
means that, in principle, there can be both too much and too little verification.  This principle
was well recognised by the original negotiators of the CWC, and led them to assign a major
role to the national authorities within the overall verification regime.  Thus, by making
individual chemical companies accountable for treaty-compliance, not in the first instance to
the OPCW, but to their national authorities, the burden of bureaucracy could be reduced; and
any threat that those companies might see to their confidential proprietary information in the
requisite accountability could be no different from that to which they were accustomed in
                                                
6This particular concept of the function of compliance-verification within a multilateral regime of chemical-
warfare arms control and disarmament is drawn from earlier studies by the present author including: Chemical
Warfare Arms Control, London: Taylor & Francis for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,
1985 [SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies no 2]; ÒVerifying a ban on chemical-warfare weaponsÓ,
Faraday Discussion Paper [London: Council for Arms Control] no 12 (1988); and ÒImplementing the Chemical
Weapons ConventionÓ, International Affairs [London: Royal Institute of International Affairs] vol 72 no 1
(January 1996) pp 73-89.
4other areas of government-industry dealings.  To reinforce this particular relative advantage
(as compared with alternative forms of verification), the negotiators devised the strict
information-confidentiality regime imposed upon States Parties by CWC Art VII.6 and upon
the OPCW Technical Secretariat by CWC Art VIII.5 and the Confidentiality Annex.
8.   The powers envisaged in the treaty for the National Authorities are extensive in that CWC
Art VII.4 assigns to these bodies the responsibility for ensuring that States Parties are
fulfilling their obligations.  Some States-Parties have established their national authorities
within their ministries of economics, trade, industry or commerce; others, within their
ministries of foreign affairs; others still, within special commissions.  Full implementation of
the CWC is proving a slow process, even though the treaty did not enter into force until 29
April 1997, more than four years after it had been opened for signature.  It is possible that,
despite the educational efforts of the OPCW Preparatory Commission and then the Technical
Secretariat, not all States-Parties have yet sufficiently appreciated what is expected of their
national authorities.  In other respects, too, the 'level playing field' on which the original
negotiators sought to ensure that their industries would compete while controlled remains
unrealised.  This is evident in, for example, the continuing absence of consensus among
States-Parties on the "low concentration" issue and on the question of which
biotechnological-process products should be treated as discrete organic chemicals "produced
by synthesis".  For the time being, it is up to each National Authority to decide for itself the
positions on these and other such issues, which it will then implement in its industry.
Furthermore, a number of key States-Parties have still to adopt legislation empowering their
National Authorities to do what the CWC requires of them.  The weight of influence of the
National Authorities within the overall regime is therefore not yet as strong as originally
intended.
9.   Wisely, the original negotiators first devised the procedures whereby the National
Authorities and the OPCW Technical Secretariat would be placed in a continuing relationship
of mutual scrutiny, and, having done that, chose to leave most of the detailed specification of
the duties of the National Authorities to the States Parties.  This is so in the case of the most
onerous obligation of all, that of CWC Art VI.2.  This provision of the treaty requires each
State Party to "adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their
precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used
within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not
prohibited under this Convention."  Only as regards the chemicals listed in the schedules of
the CWC Annex on Chemicals does the provision go on to specify how it is to be
implemented.  So it is left for individual States-Parties to decide what the "necessary
measures" should be for the huge multitude of unscheduled chemicals (including toxins and
other toxic biotechnological-process products) also subject to the Art VI.2 provision in
accordance with what has come to be called its 'general purpose criterion'.  This means, in
effect, that it is to the National Authorities, not to the OPCW, that the CWC has assigned the
task of overseeing implementation of a major provision of the treaty.  The same can be said of
several other primary obligations of the treaty for which the Technical Secretariat has no
assigned role in monitoring compliance.  Notable examples of such implementation duties
falling by default to the National Authorities include the CWC Art I.1(a) obligation not to
"develop"  chemical weapons and the CWC Art I.1(c) obligation not to "engage in any
military preparations to use chemical weapons".
510.   The extent to which National Authorities have recognised and accepted these default
duties is not yet evident from the public record.  The Iraq-UNSCOM relationship has no
doubt given pause for thought about the propriety and the effectiveness of an international
regime becoming significantly dependent upon national agencies; likewise the behaviour of
the Soviet Union towards the Biological Weapons Convention.  (Iraqi authorities have been
deliberately concealing from international inspectors an ambitious biological-weapons
programme which the UN Security Council ceasefire resolution had outlawed in 1991, at the
close of the Kuwait War.  The USSR had continued development of biological weapons even
after entry into force of the BTWC, and built large-scale production capacity for the weapons
within its civilian pharmaceutical and biotechnology-based industry.)  Yet the remedy to
compliance-dereliction at high governmental level is surely to strengthen the procedural links
between the national and international authorities, not to diminish the role of national
agencies.  The fact remains that the CWC establishes an expectation that the National
Authorities will both be accorded and exercise substantial powers for domestic
implementation of the treaty, and that their implementation is subject to international
verification.
11.   As regards particular default duties, a number of National Authorities have expressly
recognised at least the guardianship of the General Purpose Criterion which CWC Art VI.2
implicitly entrusts to them.  This can be seen in, for example, the statutory annual report to
Parliament of the UK National Authority for 1997.7 The Criterion is an element of the CWC
regime that is especially pertinent to the present paper, for it is what brings so much of
biotechnology-based industry within the ambit of the CWC verification system.
12.   The significance of the General Purpose Criterion is described in the following
paragraphs.  Quite apart from the role of the CWC National Authorities in overseeing its
implementation, it is evident from the preceding paragraphs that these bodies are essential to
effective relations the OPCW and the States-Parties.  A strengthened BTWC will surely also
require the creation or designation of counterpart national bodies.
The General Purpose Criterion
13.   The General Purpose Criterion is the device which the original negotiators of the CWC
copied from the Biological Weapons Convention in order to give adequate scope to their
treaty.  As set out in CWC Art II.1(a), it defines the objects prohibited by the
ConventionÑ"chemical weapons"Ñnot in terms of intrinsic properties but in terms of
purposes for which they exist: "toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are
consistent with such purposes".  What those purposes may be are listedÑrather more
specifically than the "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes" which the
Biological Weapons Convention uses in relation to "microbial and other biological agents,
and toxins whatever their method of production"Ñin CWC Art II.9,8 while in CWC Art II.2
                                                
7United Kingdom, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 1997 Annual Report on the Operation of the
Chemical Weapons Act 1996, February 1998.
8CWC Art II.9 reads: Ò`Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention' means:
a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;
b) Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to
protection against chemical weapons;
6"toxic chemical" is defined to mean "any chemical which through its action on life processes
can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals".  A
chemical weapon in the sense of the CWC is therefore a considerably broader concept than
the chemical weapon of, say, common military parlance.  Without that breadth, chemical-
warfare agents of novel but still-secret chemical identity, or toxic chemicals not yet
discovered or made newly accessible through manufacturing innovation, would be unaffected
by the strictures of the treaty.  The General Purpose Criterion thus allows the Convention to
keep up with technological change.
14.   No less important, the General Purpose Criterion is also the device that protects
beneficent peaceful application of the so-called 'dual use' chemicals.  These are the substances
which can serve purposes not prohibited under the CWC but which can also be used as
chemical-warfare agents, or as precursors in the manufacture of such agents.  Examples
include such widely and heavily used industrial intermediates as chlorine, phosgene and
hydrogen cyanide, which also happen to be first-generation military poison-gases.  The
General Purpose Criterion operates to permit their industrial use instead of suppressing it, as
the disarmament stipulations of the Convention would otherwise demand.  Further examples
of dual-use chemicals protected by the General Purpose Criterion are to be found within the
pharmaceutical industry, including scheduled chemicals, such as 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate
and saxitoxin, and unscheduled chemicals, such as the Clostridium botulinum toxins.
15.   The General Purpose Criterion is restated in the CWC Article VI.2 provision quoted
above (in paragraph 9) as a positive obligation upon States Parties to adopt the measures
necessary to give it force.  As regards unscheduled chemicals, one of the few areas in which
the operation of such measures is evident is the work of the Australia Group, which, however,
concerns only a limited number of chemicals and is restricted to export controls.  As regards
scheduled chemicals, Art VI.2 incorporates into the treaty both the Annex on Chemicals and
the Verification Annex whereby an agreed international control regime is defined in detail, to
be supervised by the OPCW Technical Secretariat.  The principal features of this chemical
control regime are summarized in Table 1.  Article VI.2 is thus the basis for the system of
mandatory declarations and routine inspections to which civil chemical industry is subject
under the CWC.
Table 1.  The chemical control regimes under the CWC
Elements of
control regime
For Schedule 1
chemicals
For Schedule 2
chemicals
For Schedule 3
chemicals
For
unscheduled
discrete organic
chemicals
                                                                                                                                                       
c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic
properties of chemicals as a method of warfare;
d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.Ó
7Production
limit
No more than
1000 kg of all
types may be
held by a state-
party
None specified, but all production must be for, and in
quantities consistent with, purposes not prohibited
under the Convention
Data reporting
(initial and
annual)
Yes: detailed
information on
production, use,
import and
export
Yes: for each
one, aggregate
national data on
production, use,
import and
export
Yes: for each
one, aggregate
national data on
production,
import and
export
No, except for
plant specific
data (as with
the scheduled
chemicals)
Inspection of
facilities
producing more
than threshold
quantities
Yes: highly
stringent and
augmented with
instrumented
monitoring
Yes Yes: less
stringent
Not until EIF+3
yrs, if then
approved by the
Conference of
the States
Parties
Export control Exports
permitted only
to states parties,
with advance
notification of
OPCW
End-use
certification
required until
EIF+3 yrs, after
which exports
permitted only
to states parties
End-use
certification
required; and
possibility of
other measures
after EIF+ 5 yrs
None specified
16.  In summary, then, the General Purpose Criterion is vital to the future well-being of the
CWC regime.  Any neglect over the years ahead could bring obsolescence to the regime,
opportunity for camouflaging prohibited activities, and a weakening of the safeguards against
ill-considered calls for the suppression of beneficial technologies that happen also to have
weapons applications.  It is fortunate that the BTWC contains a similar device, and it is vital
that nothing in the projected BTWC Protocol be allowed to detract from it.  Above all, it is
surely essential that such lists as may have to be written into the BTWC Protocol for
verification purposes do not come to be seen as limiting the scope of the General Purpose
Criterion, and therefore also the scope of the treaty itself.
8The Mandatory Declarations
17.   The CWC obliges States Parties to submit declarations and notifications of a wide
variety of information, some during the period immediately succeeding entry into force of the
treaty, some occasionally, and some recurrently.  Article III provides for the declarations
concerning past chemical-weapons programmes: data on any remaining holdings of chemical
weapons, including old or abandoned chemical weapons; on facilities for development,
storage, production or destruction of chemical weapons; and also on "riot control agents".
These declarations enable the OPCW Technical Secretariat to identify the facilities that the
CWC requires be made subject to "systematic verification".  Article VI provides for the
declarations of industrial rather than chemical-weapons data.  The original negotiators
intended the declarations of industrial information as means for identifying facilities whose
'dual use' attributes rendered them a particular threat to the "object and purpose of this
Convention" Ð in other words facilities that might be especially attractive to potential
cheaters seeking to conceal production of chemical-warfare agents behind a façade of
legitimate industrial activity, or even facilities that had been deliberately constructed so as to
furnish such concealment.  Thus identified, the facilities would be subject to a regime of
routine inspection intended to reduce their concealment potential and thus drive cheaters out
to more exposed venues.
18.   For purposes of the Article VI declarations, the CWC Annex on Chemicals sets out three
schedules, which together list 43 species or families of chemical: 12 in Schedule 1 (including
saxitoxin and ricin, as well as blister and nerve gases and intermediates thereof), 14 in
Schedule 2, and 17 in Schedule 3 (including hydrogen cyanide, which as a toxic agent of
biological origin is a toxin within the meaning of the Biological Weapons Convention).  Of
the 43, 27 are precursors and 16 are toxicants.  Each of the chemicals has been scheduled
because it is deemed to pose a risk to the object and purpose of the Convention, the chemicals
in Schedule 1 a "high"  risk, and those in Schedule 2 a "significant"  risk.  The scheduling
also reflects the degree of industrial application of the listed chemicals, those in Schedule 3
being ones "produced in large commercial quantities" and those in Schedule 1 "having little
or no use for purposes not prohibited under this Convention".  The three schedules are in fact
negotiated lists, though criteria for adding new chemicals to them, or removing existing ones,
are also specified in the Annex on Chemicals.  Two categories of declaration are triggered by
each schedule, one having to do with the chemicals per se, the other with facilities associated
with them.  The amount of detail required is greatest for Schedule 1 and smallest for Schedule
3, this reflecting the differing stringency of the control regime associated with each schedule.
The facilities to be declared are ones in which more than threshold quantities of the chemicals
are produced or, for chemicals on Schedules 1 and 2, processed or consumed.  The facility
declarations also extend, with certain exemptions, to plant sites where "unscheduled discrete
organic chemicals"  are "produced by synthesis"  in more than threshold quantities.  Annual
declarations are made in two broad types, one reporting data for the previous year, the other
reporting anticipated data for the year ahead.  A summary of all these declaration
requirements is given in Table 2.
Table 2.  Chemical industry declarations required of CWC States-Parties
CWC element Information to be declared by each State Party Deadline
9VerAx VII.9-10
VerAx VIII.9-
10
Each plant site where there is plant that has
produced Schedule 2 or 3 chemicals for chemical-
weapons purposes at any time since 1 January
1946
By entry into force
(EIF) + 30 days
10
CWC element Information to be declared by each State Party Deadline
VerAx VI.17-
20
Location and details of all facilities approved for
production of more than 0.1 kg/yr of Schedule 1
chemicals for research, medical or pharmaceutical
purposes.
Annual declarations also required: of prior-year
production, consumption, storage and transfer, and
of projected next-year production.
By EIF + 30 days
By year-end + 90 d
& year-start - 90 d
VerAx VII.1-2 Aggregate national data on the production,
processing, consumption, import and export of
Schedule 2 chemicals, for each such chemical
during the previous calendar year.
Declaration to be repeated annually.
By EIF + 30 days
By year-end + 90 d
VerAx VIII.1-2 Aggregate national data on the production, import
and export of Schedule 3 chemicals, for each such
chemical
Declaration to be repeated annually.
By EIF + 30 days
By year-end + 90 d
VerAx VII.3-8 Each plant site where Schedule 2 chemicals have
recently been, or will next year be, produced,
processed or consumed in amounts exceeding 1
ton/yr (or less for three of the chemicals: see Table
3), with details.
Annual declarations also required, both of prior-
year and of projected next-year activities.
By EIF + 30 days
By year-end + 90 d
& year-start - 60 d
VerAx VIII.3-8 Each plant site where Schedule 3 chemicals have
been or will be produced in amounts exceeding 30
ton/yr, with details.
Annual declarations also required, both of prior-
year and of projected next-year activities.
By EIF + 30 days
By year-end + 90 d
& year-start - 60 d
11
VerAx IX.1-6 For unscheduled discrete organic chemicals, each
plant site where more than 200 tons were
synthesized during the previous year, unless the
chemicals contain P, S or F, in which case the
threshold is 30 tons, or unless the chemicals are
exclusively explosives or hydrocarbons.
The list of sites is to be updated annually.
By EIF + 30 days
By yr-start + 90 d
19.   Information contained in the various declarations has the protection from disclosure
afforded by CWC Art VIII.5, which states that the OPCW "shall take every precaution to
protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities coming
to its knowledge in the implementation of this Convention and, in particular, shall abide by
the provisions set forth in the Confidentiality Annex".  The Confidentiality Annex requires the
OPCW Director-General to establish a special regime for protecting confidential information,
for which it sets out guidelines.  The confidentiality regime that is now in place actually
makes it rather difficult for the outside world to know even in broad terms how well the treaty
is being implemented, let alone what the content of individual facility declarations, say, might
be.  If a State-Party wishes any information it declares to the Technical Secretariat to be
protected, it simply has to designate it as 'confidential' and indicate which of the three
available levels of protection should be applied to it.  The Secretariat is then obliged to
protect the information accordingly.  The Director-General has complained publicly of the
tendency of some States Parties to assign unnecessarily high protective markings to some or
all of their declarations.  The States-Parties themselves, through their National Authorities,
are entitled under paragraph 2(b) of the Confidentiality Annex to be "routinely provided"
with such data as they require "to be assured of the continued compliance with this
Convention by other States Parties".  This provision goes on to state that such data may
include the initial and annual reports and declarations under Articles III, IV, V and VI.
According to CWC Art VII.6, it would appear that only people in government who have
responsibilities for domestic implementation of the Convention may have access to
confidential information supplied under paragraph 2(b).
20.   In summary, it is hard to envisage an international verification regime for the CWC
which did not pivot on a system for mandatory declarations.  What information should
actually be declared clearly depends upon prevailing circumstances, meaning that
mechanisms for reconsidering and, if necessary, amending the requirements are perhaps no
less important within the overall regime.  Both these conclusions are applicable also to the
projected BTWC verification regime.
The Routine Inspections
21.   If the annual quantity of scheduled chemical processed, consumed and/or produced in a
declared facility exceeds a specified threshold, the facility becomes liable to routine
inspection by the OPCW Technical Secretariat.  It is not obvious, in retrospect, that this
simple quantitative method for triggering the international inspectorate into action within
civil industry is really the best way of ensuring that all industrial 'dual use' facilities that are
12
especially vulnerable to abuse are brought within the ambit of routine inspection.  As set out
in the treaty, the trigger is clearly a compromise.  The key thing about it is that it is the
outcome of international negotiation in which senior representatives of chemical industry, as
well as diplomats and chemical-weapons experts, were involved throughout.  Important for
industry representatives was the willingness of the diplomats first to write into the treaty
stringent provisions for safeguarding confidential proprietary information (see paragraphs 7
and 19 above), secondly to accept that the number of routine inspections a State-Party would
be required to receive at declared industrial facilities each year would be rather tightly
limited, and thirdly to accept that each and every routine inspection could be governed by a
"facility agreement"  that had been negotiated bilaterally between the OPCW Technical
Secretariat and the State-Party concerned.  These facility agreements limit access by OPCW
inspectors solely to those particular areas of a plant site that had been declared as producing,
or otherwise handling, a scheduled chemical; the facility agreements preclude access to other
areas.  Within those parameters, the intrusiveness of routine inspection varies from schedule
to schedule.  A summary of the facility control regime is given in the Annex.
22.   The disclosure of information gathered by the OPCW Technical Secretariat during
routine inspections is governed in the first instance by the reporting procedure set out in
CWC Verification Annex Part II.60 and 62-65, and thereafter by the confidentiality regime
(see paragraph 19 above).  During the day following an inspection, the inspectors are to write
a preliminary report on a standardized form after they have met to review the inspection with
representatives of the inspected facility and the inspected State Party, this also being
opportunity for clarifying ambiguities.  Attached to the preliminary report is to be a list of all
data gathered, samples taken, written information obtained and anything else which the team
will be taking off site.  A copy of all this is to be given to the inspected State Party.  Within
the next ten days a final report is to be prepared and sent to the inspected State Party, whose
comments, if any, will be annexed to the report when it is transmitted to the Director-General.
The latter may, as he thinks fit, seek clarifications from the inspected State Party, and if these
prove unsatisfactory the OPCW Executive Council is to be informed without delay.
Throughout this process the report is to remain confidential.  The Confidentiality Annex, in
its paragraph 19, states that if information contained in the report has to be transmitted
beyond the inspected State Party and the Technical Secretariat, it may first be "processed into
less sensitive forms".  It was in December 1997 that routine inspection of civil chemical
industry commenced, so experience with these various provisions is only now starting to
accumulate.  There have been slight hitches, but basically the system appears to be working.
23.   In summary, the key points to note here are that routine industry inspections under the
CWC are carried out relatively infrequently (perhaps once every three years at a particular
facility), and that they are tightly circumscribed inspections that are confined to declared
areas of plant sites.
Challenge Inspection
24.   Routine inspections are not meant to discourage production of chemical weapons or
other illicit activities in undeclared facilities, nor can they be expected to deter abuse of
declared facilities, such as could conceivably happen if cheaters were to find ways of evading
the procedures prescribed for the routine verification regime.  Moreover, routine inspections
do not allow States Parties much opportunity to demonstrate that particular facilities within
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their jurisdiction are not being abused.  The challenge inspection provisions of the CWC are
intended to serve the first two of these functions.  They could also contribute to the third.  A
State-Party wishing to dispel doubts or allegations concerning its own compliance may, under
CWC Art IX.5, seek the assistance of the Executive Council to clarify the situation.  It is up
to the Council to decide what to do, but among its options will be that of organizing a special
inspection by the Technical Secretariat.  No challenge inspections have yet been conducted
under the CWC.  A number of States-Parties have, however, invited the participation of the
OPCW Technical Secretariat in practice challenge inspections.
25.   The challenge-inspection provisions of the treaty are as follows.  When a question of
compliance becomes an issue, CWC Art IX.2 requires that the States-Parties concerned first
make every effort to resolve the issue among themselves through exchange of information
and consultations.  If that does not work, the challenge procedures can be invoked.  By CWC
Art IX.8, "each State Party has the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any
facility or location...under the jurisdiction or control of any other State Party for the sole
purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance...and
to have this inspection conducted anywhere without delay by an inspection team designated
by the Director-General ...".  By CWC Art IX.11(b), the challenged State is obliged "to
provide access within the requested site for the sole purpose of establishing facts relevant to
the concern regarding possible non-compliance".  By CWC Art IX.12, the requesting State
may attach an observer to the inspection team whom the challenged State is expected but not
obliged to accept.  The challenged State is required by CWC Art IX.11(a) "to make every
reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with this Convention".
26.   Three principal limitations are placed upon the challenge-inspection process by the
Convention in order to provide protection against abuse.  These limitations follow from CWC
Art IX.9, which obliges States Parties to keep inspection requests "within the scope of this
Convention" and to justify their requests by including "appropriate information".  The first
limitation subjects requests to a filtering mechanism, the so-called `red light' procedure.  By
CWC Art IX.17, the OPCW Executive Council, to which the inspection request must be
transmitted as well as to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, may block
inspection if it deems the request to be "frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of this
Convention".  Such action requires a three-quarters majority of the Council, and must be
taken within 12 hours of the request.  The second and third limitations are mandated by CWC
Art IX.11(c), which gives the inspected State the "right to take measures to protect sensitive
installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to
this Convention".  One such protection is established by the procedures set out in CWC
Verification Annex Part X.16-21 which allow for negotiation between the inspection team
and the challenged State on where exactly the inspection is to be conducted.  This will not
prevent access, but it will allow the challenged State the best part of five days to prepare the
site for inspection (less if it is a declared site).  The second such protection is in the
procedures for "managed access"   set out in Part X.46-52 whereby there may be less than
full access to objects within the inspected site.  This may be achieved by shrouding items,
removing sensitive papers, logging-off computers, agreeing on use of Random Selective
Access techniques, and suchlike measures.
27.   The reporting procedure for a challenge-inspection team, set out in Verification Annex
X.59-61, is somewhat similar to the procedure following routine inspections (see paragraph
22 above), including the requirement that the final report be limited to the factual findings.
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The team is most definitely not required to present an assessment of compliance or
noncompliance.  The final report is, however, to be disseminated to all States Parties --
processed, if necessary, into a less sensitive form -- in preparation for the review of the report
which the Executive Council is required to conduct.  It will be on the basis of this review that
the Council will decide whether further action is or is not necessary.
28.   Challenge inspection represents the CWC verification regime at its most intrusive.  Like
the civil-industry controls, it is a precedent-setting feature of the treaty.  Walter Krutzsch and
Ralf Trapp9 describe how, in the intrusiveness of challenge inspection and in the essentially
unlimited range of sites at which it may be applied, it far surpasses such procedures as the
'unannounced inspections' of the IAEA safeguards system, the CSCE inspections, the 'short
notice inspections' of the INF treaty and the 'inspections on suspicion' of the CFE treaty.  In
the limitations placed by the Convention on challenge inspection are to be seen the most
delicate of the compromises reached by the original negotiators: a balance between, on the
one hand, the effectiveness of the central deterrent against cheating and, on the other hand,
the security of information unrelated to the Convention which, for one reason or another,
States Parties wish to keep secret.  The quest is now to strike such a balance in the "legally
binding instrument"  that is to strengthen the BTWC.  The key must surely lie, as it did with
the CWC, in the degree to which the routine and the challenge on-site inspection regime can
be made to support one another, thereby enhancing their overall deterrent effect.
Legislative and Administrative Machinery
29.   Biotechnology is a prime example of 'dual use' technology.  The manner in which the
CWC addresses dual use thus offers especially relevant guidance, even though the CWC
model may not in all respects be a good one.10  The General Purpose Criterion is, as has been
seen earlier in this paper, the central element in the CWC's dual-technology control, and,
because the BTWC also relies upon such a criterion, it will also direct the projected BTWC
Verification Protocol.  The chief problem with the criterion is that, administratively, it is far
less easy to implement than, for example, a list-based approach to what is and is not
prohibited.  The CWC, in its schedules-bounded regime of routine verification, in fact uses a
list-based approach as well as the General Purpose Criterion.  Its remedy for ensuring that
States-Parties do not in consequence come to neglect the criterion is to follow BTWC Art IV.
Thus, CWC Art VII.1 opens as follows: "Each State Party shall, in accordance with its
constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under
this Convention."  These obligations of course include the CWC Art VI.2 obligation to
implement the General Purpose Criterion (see paragraph 13 above).  In contrast to BTWC Art
IV, which adds nothing further of substance, CWC Art VII.1 goes on to specify what those
"necessary measures"  must include: "In particular, [each State Party] shall: (a) Prohibit
natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its
jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a
State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such
                                                
9Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, Nijhoff, 1994, pp.175-
76
10For an incisive account of differences between the chemical and the biological control problem, see John Gee,
ÒA strengthened BWC: lessons to be learned from the Chemical Weapons ConventionÓ, UNIDIR NewsLetter
no 33/96, pp 75-80.
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activity; (b) Not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Convention; and (c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a)
to any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by
natural persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with international law."
30.   While it appears from the declarations under BTWC confidence-building measure "E"
that rather few BTWC States Parties have taken any Article IV "necessary measures" 11,
CWC Article VII cannot so easily be disregarded.  In part this is because of the specificity of
its provisions.  In part, too, the Article has attraction as a means for reinforcing State powers
against, for example, chemical terrorism.  But there is also recognition that, in the absence of
strong and routine national measures, the international CWC regime would be an edifice built
upon sand.  That much is apparent from study of at least some of the national legislation
enacted in accordance with Article VII.  In the UK Chemical Weapons Act 1996, for example,
the general purpose criterion is implemented in full, and the steps now being taken properly
to administer the Act include efforts to ensure that the relevant authorities receive the
coöperation from the country's science and technology base without which enforcement of the
General Purpose Criterion would be a hopelessly optimistic goal.  The actual administrative
device employed is a National Authority Advisory Committee whose membership includes
representation from industry, the universities and professional scientific associations as well
as the National Authority itself and other parts of government.
31.   The CWC thus demonstrates a strong need to develop BTWC Article IV as has been
proposed12, and thereby, as the mandate of the BTWC Ad Hoc Group puts it, "to improve the
implementation of the Convention"   of the BTWC.
Conclusion
32.   A conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing descriptions is that the CWC verification
regime affords useful parallels for the regime now being negotiated for the Biological
Weapons Convention, even though some features, such as the chemical-weapons destruction
provisions, are unlikely to be inappropriate.  The relevant features will include:
(1) an international organization charged with overseeing implementation of the treaty
in a division of labour with national authorities;
(2) mandatory declarations that ensure continuing oversight of biotechnology by
National Authorities that operate under the scrutiny of the international authority; and
(3) an international on-site-inspection regime wherein challenge and non-challenge
visits, the latter linked to the declarations, mutually reinforce one another to the
detriment of potential cheaters.
                                                
11See Iris Hunger, Article V: Confidence-Building Measures,  in Graham S Pearson & Malcolm R Dando,
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference,  Quaker UN
Office, Geneva, September 1996.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
12Graham S Pearson and Nicholas A Sims, National Implementation Measures, University of Bradford, Briefing
Paper No 4, January 1998.   Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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A strengthened BTWC will require a verification regime in which these features are carefully
integrated.  It is fitting that the result would resemble the counterpart CWC regime, for there
is much in common between biological and chemical weapons.  Moreover, given that toxins
are covered by both treaties, some overlaps and a consistency in approach are going to be
essential.
